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The Chinese traders in French Indochina: Partners or rivals? 
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In the early twentieth century, contemporary observers acknowledged that the export trade out of 
north Vietnam was dominated by Chinese traders. There was considerable public interest in their 
fortunes expressed by British and Chinese in Hong Kong, the French in Indochina and Chinese in 
China.2 This study examines Chinese involvement in the Tonkin rice trade during the French 
colonial period, tracing the changing fortunes of the Chinese rice merchants of Haïphong. It gives 
special attention to the levels of co-operation which existed between the French colonial 
authorities and the Chinese merchants. 
 
Haïphong as a French port 
 
The French treaty of 1874 declared the port Haïphong in northern Vietnam, or Tonkin as the it 
was then known, open to European and other commerce and allowed the appointment of a French 
consul and a combined French-Vietnamese customs office.3 Following French occupation, export 
companies based in Haïphong included the French company Roque Frères, who were the 
correspondents for Denis Frères; the French shipping company, A.R. Marty, which was based in 
Hongkong; and numerous English flag-ships which were chartered by Chinese compradors in 
Hong Kong.4  Given that the rice trade represented the largest source of export income and it was 
a severe blow to the Haïphong merchants when the Vietnamese government instituted a series of 
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bans on the export of rice during the years 1876 to 1880.5 In 1878 the French consul at Haïphong, 
Champeaux, noted that the Hong Kong firms had lost all hope of the prohibition being lifted. The 
only exception had been that the Mandarins allowed Tonkin rice to be sent south to Danang.6  
In 1879 and again in 1880 the Chinese merchants of Haïphong sent a petition to the 
French consul, stating that if their demands were not met they would be forced to leave the 
country. They asked that rice be allowed to be exported to all parts of the world; that the 
navigation on all rivers be entirely free; and that interior customs be abolished. The petition was 
signed by some twenty Chinese merchants.7 One of the petitioners was Wang Tai, a prominent 
Cantonese rice merchant based in Saigon.8  Another petitioner was Guan-Sing, Hokkien rice 
merchant, also based in Saigon. At this time there was an indication of common purpose between 
the Chinese and European traders, demonstrated by the fact that the Chinese listed amongst their 
demands the opening of Nam-Dinh to European trade. The ban on rice export applied only to the 
French concession of Haïphong and did not apply to the Chinese merchants of Nam-Dinh. 
Chinese traders with Hong Kong connections were concerned that their ships would not be 
permitted to trade out of Nam-Dinh. The Chinese Merchants Steam Navigation Company, for 
example, sailed under English flag with English captains.9 
The French consul, writing to the Governor in 1880, explained that already a good 
number of merchants had left Haïphong. The Chinese, he stated, were demanding the French 
occupation of Tonkin to bring about greater concessions for foreign trade. The Chinese made it 
clear that they could not be openly hostile to the Vietnamese government because of the nature of 
their centuries old relations. Their preference for maintaining favour with the Mandarins, they 
argued, was all the more necessary given that the French might still decide to abandon Tonkin.10  
The ban on rice export in this period was not total. The export figures for 1880 indicate 
that 25,630 tonnes of rice were exported, valued at over 5 million francs.11 The ban was lifted in 
1881, but already it had become clear that the French concession of Haïphong would never 
achieve economic success while the Vietnamese government continued to give preference to the 
port of Nam Dinh.12  
As if in answer to the Chinese demands, within a year, the French did indeed arrive in 
force and began the conquest of Tonkin. The commandant Henri Rivière came to Haïphong on 2 
April 1882 with 450 men. He took Hanoi on 25 April. The Chinese merchants fled from Hanoi 
and installed themselves provisionally in Haïphong where they could more easily reach the sea 
and China.13 The French took the port of Nam Dinh in 1883 and immediately decreed that interior 
customs would be abolished on the Red River.14 In April 1883, the French military seized and 
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occupied the Haïphong warehouses owned by Li Hongzhang of the China Merchants Steam 
Navigation Company.15 
The French military administration forced all trade to divert past Haïphong by banning 
ships from using any river routes to the sea other than the Cua-Câm. Nam-Dinh, now denied 
direct access to the sea, ceased to be the primary export port, despite its history as a centre for rice 
collection. In order to control Chinese shipping the French announced a system of permits for all 
ships.16 Three French customs depots were established in Haïphong, Hanoi and Nam-Dinh and 
the first produce to be taxed was rice. In November 1884, the French passed another law, limiting 
exports to Haïphong, and thus completing the transformation of Haïphong from minor trading 
port to the major port of Tonkin. 17  
With the French firmly established in Haïphong, they set about creating the infrastructure 
to support large-scale trade. Between 1885 and 1887 a three kilometre long canal was cut through 
the town. In the newly shaped Haïphong, the main commercial port, which was almost 
exclusively European, was situated on the river Cua-Câm, while the smaller Sông Tam-bac came 
to be regarded as the Chinese port.18 The Sông Tam-bac was the river route to Hanoi and Nam-
Dinh. In 1884 the trip to Hanoi from Haïphong took twenty hours by river, sailing via the Lach-
Tray, Lach-Van-Ue, Thai-Binh, Cua-Doc and finally arriving at the Red River.19 
 
Chinese merchants after French occupation 
The Franco-Chinese treaty of Tientsin, signed in 1885, allow Chinese to enter and operate 
commercially in Vietnam.20 While the French occupation of Tonkin initially disrupted the 
Chinese population, it also had the effect of concentrating the Chinese in Haïphong. The Chinese 
population had been less than 1,500 in 1883, but this figure rose to 4,700 by 1886. Saigon's 
Chinese population by comparison was roughly double, being 8,853. The Chinese population of 
Hanoi by contrast had dwindled to 850 persons. Bac-Ninh, once a thriving trading town, with a 
Chinese population of 1,600 at the time of the French invasion, but by 1887 had only 70 Chinese. 
Nam-Dinh, once the major port for Chinese traders, now had a Chinese population of only 600. 21  
In contrast, the Chinese population of Haiphong grew from 5,600 in 1890 to 20,186 in 1929. 22 
In 1889, the Haïphong Chamber of Commerce was set up with eight European members, 
one Vietnamese member and one Hokkien member, ship-owner and merchant Guan-Sing.23  The 
presence of Guan-Sing, who had been one of the petitioners of 1880, in the Chamber of 
Commerce indicates that there was some continuity between those Chinese who had asked for the 
French occupation of Haïphong in 1880 and those who gained prominent office in Haïphong in 
later years. From 1892-1896 Yuen-Tai-Ling took over Guan-Sing's place in the Chamber and he 
 4 
too was one of the original petitioners from 1880. It is not clear, however, that the position was 
anything more than honorary. In 1899 the Chamber of Commerce became exclusively European 
in membership. Nevertheless the Haïphong Chamber of Commerce continued to support the rice 
trade, protesting in 1899 over the export tax on rice being higher in Tonkin than in Cochinchina.24  
Although Guan-Sing was Hokkien, most of the rice merchants were Cantonese, such as 
Hang-Wo, who was head of the Cantonese congregation in 1899. As an indication of relative 
numerical strength of merchants, the Cantonese Kah On Club of Haïphong, opened in 1894, had a 
membership of 40 merchants and their employees. The Phoc On Club, opened in 1896, had 
membership of eighteen Hokkien merchants.25 Unlike in Cochinchina, there was initially only 
one congregation for all Chinese in Tonkin and it was not until 1889 that the Hokkien were 
allowed to form their own congregation, separating from the Cantonese congregation.  
 
The expansion of the rice trade 
 
In 1889 there were some 65,000 tons of rice exported from Haïphong, almost all being exported 
to Hong Kong.26  The number of rice merchants in Haïphong at the time was still quite small. In 
1891 there were three Chinese rice merchants listed in the official records for Haïphong.27 The 
overall Chinese population in 1891 had fallen from 5,600 in the previous year to only 2,000. By 
1894 there were nineteen Chinese rice merchants, categorized according to patents which ranged 
from first to fourth class. There were three first class merchants (Khien-Yune, Shun-Tai and 
Wing-Tuong-Cat ) six third class merchants, and ten fourth class merchants.28  The Shun Tai 
company first appears listed as a 1st class rice merchant in 1892.29 Tam Sec Sam of Shun Tai still 
appears in 1911 lists as an exporter and ship owner. By 1934, the Shun Tai company is one of the 
largest in Haïphong. Further details of this company are discussed later in this paper. 
By 1901 the number of rice merchants had grown to twenty-three, all but one being 
located in the Rue Chinoise, close to the Chinese port. According to a correspondent writing for 
the Hong Kong Telegraph, the export of rice from Tonkin was entirely in Chinese hands and its 
organization was 'one of the most perfect in the Far East'. The writer was highly critical of the 
French government's treatment of the Haïphong Chinese, however, complaining of high patent 
fees, high taxes, and the requirement to purchase and carry identity cards. He was also critical of 
French newspapers which regularly attacked Chinese merchants, accusing them of being in 
league with the Black Flags.30 
It is in the nature of the speculative character of the rice trade that it encouraged a high 
turn-over of merchants. The Chinese names listed over the next twelve years as being involved in 
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the rice trade change regularly. But there was an overall growth in Chinese involvement and in 
particular an increase in ship-owners who were also rice traders. The 1911 records include five 
rice merchants who are also ship-owners: Po-Yuen dit Tchong-vai-Tchine, Kuong-Tac-Hing, 
Lune-Tai dit Tam-Nang-Siou, Kong-Heng-Long, On-Fat, and Hang-Vo. There are also six 
Chinese listed simply as ship-owners, Kwong-Sang-Yune dit Luong-Meng, Tze-Soy-Cheong dit 
Wah-On, Loy-Sing, Tam Sec-Sam dit Shun-Tai, Sine-One et Cie, Ly-Minh et Cie. Unfortunately, 
in 1917 this detailed information is removed from the Year Books and by the 1920s almost all 
records of Chinese companies are gone from the Year Books, with even the street name 'rue 
Chinoise' failing to appear in the street index. 
 
French attempts to stifle Chinese competition 
 
In their study of Chinese enterprise in colonial Malaya, Lian Kwen Fee and Koh Keng We 
describe the period between 1900 and 1940 as one which 'saw a siginificant shift away from 
partnership between Chinese entrepreneurs and British rulers'.31 There appears to have been a 
similar shift in French Indochina with French protectionism manifesting itself in the form of 
stricter regulation of Chinese enterprise. On the other hand, in the port of Haïphong, where the 
Chinese held a clear monopoly over the export trade, the attitudes of the French officials were 
necessarily tempered by pragmatic considerations as compared with those of the French business. 
An example of competition between French and Chinese companies can be seen in the 
1903 letter, from the French shipping company A.R. Marty to the Governor General. A.R. Marty 
complained that they faced fierce competition from a Chinese coalition that had extended its 
trading sphere to include Haïphong.32 According to Marty, the Chinese coalition was formed in 
October 1895 to fight against their French shipping line that traded between Hong Kong, Hoihao 
and Pakhoi. This coalition was instigated by the secret society Tsap Yet. The Chinese company 
Hop Sing and Co., sailed two ships under Danish flag, while the Tsap Yet, sailed seven ships 
under German flag, chartered from the German firms Sander, Wieler and Co. and Jebsen and 
Co.33 
If in fact there were a close alliance between the German ships trading in Haïphong and 
the Chinese merchants this relationship was to come under severe strain in 1908. In that year, the 
Chinese rice merchants of Haïphong established a boycott of Japanese imports in line with policy 
emanating from China. In May 1908 the German ship, Karl Diederichsen, one of the ships usually 
chartered by the Chinese, arrived in Haïphong with a load of Japanese products. The Chinese rice 
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merchants sent a telegram to Speidel and Co. the ship-owners, advising them that if they 
transported Japanese goods the Chinese would not give any more cargo to German ships.34  
At the time Speidel and Co. had four ships trading into Haïphong, the Karl Diederichsen, 
the Holstein, the Koenigsberg and the Triumph.35  An indication of the close trade links between 
the Speidel and the Chinese merchants is that while all other sea-going vessels came to the main 
commercial port on the Cua-Câm, the Karl Diederichsen and the Triumph were listed in the 
newspaper as being moored at the Chinese river port. 
  In 1909 all European traders became openly competitive in their dealings with the 
Chinese merchants. A possible catalyst for this was the change in administration. In September 
1908 a new Governor General, Antony Klobukowski, was appointed. Klobukowski had lived in 
Vietnam twenty years earlier and had left to take up the position of French consul in Yokohama.36  
His return to Haïphong was marked by an unusual degree of interest in shipping practice. In 
January 1909, the maritime commissioner at Haïphong informed French shipping company 
Roque that a message had been sent by the new Governor General, stating that Roque was in 
breach of the Maritime Law of 1902 which required ships to have a French captain. The ship 
Benthuy was about to sail with a Chinese captain and was consequently refused permission to 
leave port.37 Roque ignored the ban and the ship left port, despite being denied the services of a 
pilot. This minor incident suggests that the new Governor General had quite strong opinions 
about the Chinese and was determined to see French interests protected. 
 In April 1909 the Chinese merchants of Haïphong announced that they were boycotting 
all European shipping companies, following the announcement by the German, English and 
French shipping companies that they were raising the cost of freight between Haïphong and Hong 
Kong by thirty percent. Given that almost all Haïphong's rice was exported to Hong Kong this 
would have had a crippling effect on the rice trade.38 A Chinese merchant interviewed by the 
Avenir du Tonkin stated that with the price of rice being so low they would not be able to afford 
higher freight costs. As a result the rice merchants had formed an association to become 
shipowners so that they could export their own rice directly to Hong Kong.39 
The Chinese rivalry with Japanese traders became clear when Japanese merchant, seeing 
a potential opening in the market, expressed interest in expanding trade between Japan and 
Haïphong. He suggested that first it would be necessary to improve the quality of local rice by 
bringing in Japanese farmers to train the Vietnamese farmers.40 Nothing further came of this 
however, and shipping figures for Haïphong indicate that Japanese trade did not become 
significant until after 1913.41 
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The Chinese rice merchants were successful in launching their own ship and were thus 
able to maintain their boycott of the European shipping lines. On 25 April 1909 the Steamer 'Tri' 
belonging to the 'Société Chinoise de Riz' left for Hong Kong with 18,000 sacks of rice.42 No rice 
was shipped on European ships. This action by the Chinese threatened to ruin European trade in 
Haïphong and not surprisingly the French took action to protect themselves. In September 1909 
the Haïphong Chamber of Commerce asked the government to ban the export of rice from 
Tonkin.43 Newspaper reports indicate that the ban was passed by the Governor General with the 
explicit intention of breaking the Chinese boycott.44 
 
French responses to Chinese traders 1925-1934 
 
The nationalist sentiments of the local French authorities are clearly expressed in a letter of 
complaint to Shun Tai in 1925 from the Mayor of Haïphong who accused him of lacking respect 
for French traditions by failing to raise the flag in honour of the national holiday. The young Tam 
Seng Sec, signing himself as Shun Tai responded with an elegant and apologetic letter, stating 
that in regards to his two ships the New Mathilde and the Borneo, he had assumed that the 
captains knew the requirements without being reminded by him on each occasion and that he was 
sorry for having forgotten to go and check the ships on the wharf. Although he signed himself the 
humble servant of the Mayor the tone, in my opinion, seems to suggest that he regarded such 
complaints as trivial.45 In fact, it was a very short stroll from the Shun Tai shopfront on 149-151 
rue Chinoise to the wharf.46 
In 1925 the export of rice from Haïphong was restricted and rice traders were forced to 
apply to the Resident Superior of Tonkin for permission to export rice. Many requests were for 
permission to export 1,000 tonnes but the largest requests in 1927 came from Kwang Man Yuen 
of Hong Kong, asking to export 10,000 tonnes in 1927 and Shun Tai, exporting 10,000 tonnes to 
Hong Kong. A second request was submitted from the Tam Seng Sec, but this request was made 
in his role as Director of the rice mill Rizerie Tchoune Yeck in Haly on the outskirts of 
Haïphong.47  
Relations between the French officials and the Chinese merchants of Haïphong reached 
something of a crisis point in August 1927 when anti-Chinese riots broke out in Haïphong, lasting 
several days. Some one hundred and fifty people were arrested and while reports vary as to the 
number of deaths, figures suggest about 100 Chinese were killed by Vietnamese. The Haïphong 
branch of the Kuomingtang appealed to the Chinese Nationalist government, asking them to send 
a war ship to protect their citizens. In 1928, Chu Chao Hsin, the Vice Minister of External Affairs 
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of the Nationalist Government in China, sent a delegation to Haïphong to inquire as to amount of 
financial loss sustained by the Chinese merchants there and to demand that the French 
government of Indochina pay indemnities. 48 
The French authorities intercepted and translated letters, many sent from Nam Dinh, the 
closest river port to Haïphong where Chinese had fled for safety. One letter was sent to parents in 
Macao, another to Saigon and another to Canton. The extent of the Chinese networks in this 
period was such that the Central Committee of the Kuomingtang in Nankin then sent letter to all 
sections of the Kuomintang, including places such as Phnompenh, describing the plight of their 
'emigrant brothers'.  
The French authorities had compiled a list of 69 Chinese shops, factories, companies, 
ships and junks which were pillaged, giving details of the owners and the extent of the damage. 
This ranged from broken windows to complete destruction; one business estimating the damage 
at 6,000 piastres. Luong-Cheong-Hoi and Kwong Vo Hinh, rice mill owners, had sacks of rice 
stolen. Two junks in the Chinese port on the Song-Tam-Bac river were pillaged and one junk 
from Quang Yen on the Canal Bonnal was completely burnt. The Fong Ly Seng rice mill had 600 
sacks of rice stolen and $3000 in cash. The attacks were directed at all Chinese and not merely 
big businesses. Victims included butchers, pharmacies and opium sellers.  
Despite the severity of the crisis, the French business sector remained virtually 
untouched. Of the 22 European-owned factories only the Rizerie Indochinoise was closed for 12 
days. Of the 20 Chinese-owned factories all were closed on the 20 August and most stayed closed 
until the 28 August. These included five rice mills owned by Shun Tai, Hop-Long, Shun-Fat-
Yune, Fong Ly Seng, and Luong Cheong Hoi.49 
Soon after this incident, the Chinese Nationalist Government showed its concern for the 
Chinese expatriate community by concluding the Nanking convention of 1930 which gave 
Chinese residents in Vietnam the status of foreigners with special privileges.50 These special 
privileges were of little use, however, in protecting Chinese merchants from the onset of the 
world depression. During the depression Chinese merchants suffered heavy financial losses, 
forced to sell rice at low prices to meet liabilities with colonial banks. Martin Murray notes that 
between 1929 and 1932 there were 236 bankruptcies and 24 legal liquidations in Saigon and 
Cholon.51  
The Resident Superior of Tonkin, Tholance, wrote to the Governor General of Indochina 
explaining that the hardest hit by the economic crisis were those involved in the export trade in 
Haïphong, which was almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese. He explained that amongst all 
the companies that had gone bankrupt, the failure of Shun Tai would be literally catastrophic for 
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trade in Haïphong. He noted that the company had suffered difficulties in 1921 when the head of 
the company, Tam Tsec Sam died. Shun Tai was then taken over by his widow and his eldest son 
Tam Seng Sec. The current debt with the Bank of East Asia was $120,000. He noted that as the 
Bank of East Asia had closed their Haïphong branch they were unwilling to consider Tam Seng 
Sec's proposition.  
The Governor General wrote to the French consul in Hong Kong, asking that he speak 
with the Bank of East Asia and ask them to lift their veto. He asked that they listen to Tam Seng 
Sec and hoped that if the bank understood the market in Tonkin better that they might take a 
stance more favourable to Chinese commerce.52 There is some irony in the French colonial 
government being forced to plead for more favourable conditions for Chinese commerce, 
negotiation between a Cantonese bank and a Cantonese merchant. This aspect of Chinese-French 




This overview of some fifty years of Chinese trade in northern Vietnam suggests some sense of 
continuity in terms of the relationship between Chinese business and French colonial officials. In 
1880 the Chinese rice merchants of Haïphong were asking the French authorities to intervene on 
their behalf against the ban on rice trade, in this case to colonise Tonkin so as to create conditions 
more favourable to Chinese trade. In the 1930s, in the face of the world depression and yet 
another threat to Chinese trade, the Chinese merchants again sought French intervention. 
Undoubtedly the French are motivated to help because they recognise that without Chinese trade, 
the port of Haïphong will provide little profit for the French empire. In classic interpretations of 
the role of Chinese business in Southeast Asia, scholars speak of the Chinese intermediary or 
'middleman' serving the European colonisers. They point to the gradual breaking-up of that 
relationship as the Europeans gained a firmer foothold in the colonies and anti-Chinese ideologies 
became more prominent. While there was evidence of such anti-Chinese sentiments within the 
French administration, this study has shown little evidence of a relationship that might be referred 
to as 'intermediary'. Rather, where the French collaborate with Chinese merchants it is as foreign 
nationals who provide a source of income. On the other hand, the strong links between the 
Haïphong Chinese and the British in Hong Kong suggests that this port needs to be understood as 
a part of British colonial history where the French remain, at least to some extent, outsiders. 
Certainly the connection between Indochina and Hong Kong deserves further investigation if we 
are to understand the nature of Chinese trade on the Water Frontier. 
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